In 2020, the Abraham Accords, reshaped Middle East diplomacy by establishing ties between Israel and several Arab countries, creating a historic platform to integrate the region. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed first, followed by Morocco and Sudan. Unlike earlier agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Accords did not require progress on the Palestinian issue; instead, prioritizing regional cooperation, economic growth, and shared security.
But five years later, momentum has slowed as concerns over national sovereignty outweigh external incentives amid the unresolved situation in Gaza and ongoing regional instability. For the Accords to endure and expand, they must move beyond public relations and demonstrate they can address the region’s challenges through joint action.
Despite stalling, there have been bright spots. The UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain have strengthened ties with Israel even amid the Gaza war, with normalization enabling cooperation that would have otherwise been impossible. For example, the UAE and Morocco leveraged their relationship with Israel to deliver more humanitarian aid to Gaza, coordinate on de-escalation efforts, and maintain channels of communication during the conflict.
The question now is whether the framework can evolve into operational reality.
Saudi Arabia remains essential for broad Arab and Muslim support of the Accords. Its religious and political influence could make normalization more acceptable across the Islamic world. To move forward, it requires a credible pathway to a Two State solution.
There are many explanations for this approach. As Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Saudi Arabia is carrying the mantle for the Muslim world. It recognizes normalization with Israel is a prize for both Jerusalem and Washington, and that it’s a move it can only play once. The war in Gaza is deeply unpopular in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, with decades left of his reign, isn’t in a rush to force such a consequential decision, particularly if it could spark public discontent.
Domestic instability on the Palestinian issue is not uncommon in the region. For example, in 1970, Jordan faced unrest from Palestinian militants; in Lebanon, Palestinian groups disrupted the balance among religious communities during the civil war; and Gulf states have struggled with the influence of groups like the Abo Nidal Organization. These cases demonstrate that unresolved Palestinian issues can threaten domestic stability.
Radicalization further complicates the situation. Flashpoints such as settlement expansion in the West Bank or clashes at al-Aqsa Mosque serve as powerful propaganda for groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. These incidents resonate emotionally with Arab publics, portraying normalization signatories as complicit in the perceived desecration of holy sites. This dynamic undermines the accords’ narrative of security and tolerance. Addressing these challenges requires coordinated messaging on mutual benefits, agreements on mosque governance, and settlement moratoriums to reduce tensions.
The UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain have strengthened ties with Israel and leveraged their relationship to support the Palestinians in Gaza, the rest of the region is waiting. Oman and Qatar remain neutral, favoring informal talks to preserve their role as mediators. Kuwait is currently opposed to normalization and unlikely to move forward before Saudi Arabia.
But there has been momentum outside the region, on November 6 Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords. The inclusion of Astana, which has existing ties with Israel, opens the door for additional countries in Central Asia to also join.
In Asia, Indonesia illustrates that resistance to normalization is a global issue. As the second largest Muslim-majority country, most Indonesians strongly support the Palestinians. Indonesia’s cautious approach reflects both internal challenges and its aspiration to lead on Muslim issues. President Prabowo Subianto is moving steadily and cautiously towards better relations with the U.S. and pragmatically towards a quiet and steady normalization with Israel that could evolve into normalization in the coming period.
Libya’s experience in 2023 highlighted the risks of moving toward a normalization. News of a secret meeting between Libyan and Israeli foreign ministers sparked large protests and political turmoil. This incident demonstrated how domestic sensitivities can provoke strong opposition and disrupt diplomacy. Progress will depend on quiet diplomacy on all sides.
The UAE’s intervention to halt Israeli annexation plans in 2020 demonstrated that normalization can encourage moderation when it delivers tangible benefits. By offering Israel diplomatic recognition and economic opportunities, Abu Dhabi preserved the possibility of a two-state solution and promoted regional cooperation. This case suggests that collaboration is more effective than isolation.
Looking ahead, a revised version of the Accords will need to show that it offers a real basis for cooperation, rather than serving as a public relations effort. For the region to benefit and for additional countries to participate, Arab and Israeli leaders must show that the Accords can address significant challenges through joint action, not by acting alone. This means moving beyond bilateral agreements and onto shared regional opportunities such as establishing integrated air defense architecture against Iranian drones and missiles, creating joint investment mechanisms for IMEC infrastructure and Gaza reconstruction, launching collaborative initiatives on water security and food systems, and cooperation on AI governance and cybersecurity operations centers. Only through direct communication and agreement on broader strategies — backed by concrete, multi-country projects that deliver tangible benefits — can the Accords become a credible foundation for regional stability and a wider peace.